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Copying the behaviour of others is important for forming social bonds with other people and for 
learning about the world [1].  After seeing an actor demonstrate actions on a novel object, typically 
developing (TD) children faithfully copy both necessary and visibly unnecessary actions [2]. This 
 ?ŽǀĞƌŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?is commonly described in terms of learning about the object, but may also reflect a 
social process such as the ĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶ to affiliate with the demonstrator [3] or to conform to 
perceived norms [4]. Previous studies of overimitation do not separate object learning and social 
imitation because they use novel objects.  Even though researchers consider these objects to be 
causally transparent in their mechanism, ǇŽƵŶŐĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐĐĂƵƐĂůƌĞĂƐŽŶŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚŶŽǀĞůŽďũĞĐƚƐŝƐ
unclear [4]. The present study measures the social component of overimitation by using familiar 
objects, which preclude the learning component of the task. Here we report a significant reduction 
in overimitation in children with autism spectrum conditions (ASC).  This is coherent with reports 
that these children have profound difficulties with social engagement [5] and do not spontaneously 
imitate action style [6] (see also [7]). 
We tested 31 children with ASC, 30 TD children matched for verbal mental age and 30 TD children 
matched for chronological age on an overimitation task using familiar objects.  All children were 
assessed for verbal mental age, overimitation and understanding of action rationality (see 
Supplementary Information).  On each of five trials, the child was asked to watch carefully as a 
demonstrator showed how to retrieve a toy from a box or build a simple object. Critically, each 
demonstration included two necessary actions (e.g. unclipping and removing the box lid) and one 
unnecessary action (e.g. tapping the top of the box twice). The apparatus was then reset behind a 
screen and handed to the child ?ǁŚŽǁĂƐŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚ “ŐĞƚ/make ƚŚĞƚŽǇĂƐĨĂƐƚĂƐǇŽƵĐĂŶ ? ?These 
instructions emphasise the goal, and copying was never mentioned.  This means any overimitation is 
spontaneous and socially motivated.  All trials were videotaped for analysis, and completion of the 
unnecessary action was coded as overimitation.  After all overimitation trials, children watched the 
demonstrator complete individual actions from each sequence, and rated each action on a five point 
ƐĐĂůĞĨƌŽŵ ?ƐĞŶƐŝďůĞ ?ƚŽ ?ƐŝůůǇ ? ?Rationality discrimination was calculated as the difference between a 
ĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐƌĂƚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƵŶŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇĂĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚthe necessary action from the same sequence, with high 
scores indicating good judgement of which action is more rational. 
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All TD children were able to complete all tasks and retrieve or build the toy on every trial; children 
with ASC completed the tasks on 97% of trials (see Supplementary Information). However, we found 
a striking difference between autistic and TD children in both overimitation and rationality 
discrimination.  TD children copied 43-57% of the unnecessary actions but children with autism 
copied only 22% (Figure 1A).   All groups performed significantly above chance in the rationality 
discrimination task, but children with autism performed worse than the TD children (Figure 1B).  
These results have several implications. 
First, TD children show substantial overimitation of unnecessary actions on familiar objects, despite 
understanding ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞ ?ƐŝůůǇ ? ?These results lend support for the position that 
overimitation in typical children is a social phenomenon ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶďĞŝŶŐĚƌŝǀĞŶďǇƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚ ?Ɛ
causal learning about the objects.  This social overimitation may index ĂĐŚŝůĚ ?Ɛ motivation [5] to 
affiliate [3] or to conform to perceived norms [4]. 
^ĞĐŽŶĚ ?ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶǁŝƚŚĂƵƚŝƐŵƐŚŽǁƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇůĞƐƐŽǀĞƌŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚŽƌ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?
This is not driven by weak motor skill because all the unnecessary actions were familiar simple 
actions (e.g. tapping a box) and all children were able to complete the more complex goal-directed 
actions in the sequence.  It is also not driven by superior causal reasoning, because the children with 
ASC also performed worse on the rationality discrimination task.  The data go beyond previous 
studies which showed reduced imitation of action style [6] and reduced spontaneous imitation [8] 
where differences in behaviour could be driven by the children with autism failing to adopt the same 
goal as the demonstrator.  In our task, children are instructed that the goal is to make/retrieve the 
toy, and all are able to do so.  The failure of children with autism to spontaneously copy unnecessary 
actions can best be explained in terms of reduced social motivation in these children, with less 
desire or ability to affiliate with or conform to the perceived norm.   
Previous studies have examined social attention in autism using eye-tracking tasks [9], and have 
examined social motivation using brain-imaging of high functioning adults with ASC [reviewed in 5], 
but simple methods for measuring social motivation in children did not exist.  The ease of 
implementing our task, and the close links between overimitation and social mimicry in adults [3], 
mean that this approach can provide a powerful and general tool for examining social motivation in 
child and adult participants.  There is an important contrast between our results and a recent study 
in which children with autism saw unnecessary actions on novel objects and showed the same rate 
of overimitation as typical children [10].  One possible interpretation of this difference is that the 
study using novel objects [10] tapped imitation-to-learn which may be intact in autism, while social 
imitation, as tested with our simple familiar objects, is atypical.  Such a distinction is congruent with 
previous theories that posit normal goal-directed imitation and abnormal social imitation in autism 
[7] but further testing of the circumstances that drive children with autism to imitate would be 
valuable. 
Overall, our paper leads to two important conclusions.  First, studies of social interaction can 
examine the social component of imitation behaviour independent of the object-learning 
component, and this can best be done using familiar objects.  Second, children with autism do not 
show overimitation of actions on familiar objects.  This specific difference in a behaviour linked to 
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Figure 1A: Number of trials where the unnecessary action was copied (maximum 5) in TD and ASC 
participants.  There was a significant reduction in overimitation behaviour in ASC participants 
compared to CA-match (F(1,58)=12.84, p<0.001) and VMA-match (F(1,58) = 7.01, p=0.01) TD 
controls. Error bars represent +/- 1 standard error. 
Figure 1B: Mean rationality discrimination score (ranging from -4 to 4) in TD and ASC participants.  
All three groups performed significantly above chance (zero) (CA-match: t(29)=16.1, p<0.001; VMA-
match: t(29)=10.2, p<0.001; ASC: t(30)=5.9, p<0.001).  Children with ASC were significantly worse at 
judging the rationality of actions, when compared to CA-matched (F(1,58)=19.62, p<0.001) and 
VMA-matched (F(1,58)=9.29, p=0.003) groups. Error bars represent +/- 1 standard error. See also 
Figure S1.  
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Supplemental Experimental Procedures 
Participants 
Participants were 31 children with autism (ASC), 30 typically developing children matched for 
chronological age (CA-match) and 30 typically developing children matched for verbal mental age 
(VMA-match). Table S1 describes the profile of each group.  
All children in the autism group had a diagnosis of autism, autism spectrum condition or Asperger’s 
syndrome from an independent clinician or paediatrician. This diagnosis was confirmed using parent 
reports of the social communication questionnaire lifetime edition (SCQ, [S1]) in 27 participants. 
Additionally, one participant scored just below the recommended cut-off for autism on this measure 
and three parents failed to complete it. These four participants were all recruited through specialist 
schools for autism or through an autism unit at a mainstream school so we are confident of their 
diagnoses.   However, to ensure that these participants did not alter our results, all analyses were 
performed with and without these participants (see supplementary results). Parents of all children 
completed the Social Aptitudes Scale (SAS, [S2]), a measure of their child’s current social abilities. As 
expected, children with ASC scored significantly lower on this measure than children in the CA-match 
and VMA-match groups (CA: t(53)=14.5, p<0.001, VMA: t(55)=12.8, p<0.001). Two children with 
autism scored just outside of the recommended cut-off for autism on this measure, although they 
both met criteria for autism on the SCQ and had a clinical diagnosis. No children in either of the 
typically developing groups met the recommended criteria for autism on the SAS and parents of 
these children reported no developmental disorder. 
Children with autism were recruited from schools in the Nottingham area.   Typically developing 
children took part in the study as part of the Summer Scientists week event where children complete 
a number of cognitive tasks over half a day at the University of Nottingham.  The parents of all 




Table S1: Participant characteristics for chronological age (CA) matched, verbal mental age (VMA) 
matched and autism spectrum condition (ASC) groups. Figures reported are group mean ± standard 
deviation and (range). 
Group CA- match VMA- match ASC 
n 30 30 31 
Age 
8.66 ± 2.0 
(4.9 - 12.7) 
6.0 ± 1.3 
(4.2 - 8.6) 
9.4 ± 2.3 
(5.2 - 13.6) 
BPVS raw 
94.5 ± 19.9 
(57 - 137) 
65.9 ± 20.6 
(35 - 122) 
66.7 ± 21.5 
(33 - 119) 
SAS 
27.6 ± 4.7 
(10 - 39) 
24.1 ± 4.1 
(17 - 32) 
9.2 ± 4.6 
(0 - 19) 
Overimitation 
2.6 ± 1.9 
(0 - 5) 
2.2 ± 2.1 
(0 - 5) 
1.1 ± 1.6 
(0 - 5) 
Rationality 
Discrimination 
2.5 ± 0.8 
(0 - 3.4) 
2.2 ± 1.2 
(-0.8 - 4) 
1.3 ± 1.2 
(-1.2 - 4) 
Theory of Mind 
(%) 
not collected not collected 
57.7 ± 28.7 
(0 - 100) 
SCQ scores not collected not collected 
25.5 ± 4.9 
(15-33) 
Abbreviations: CA- chronological age; VMA- verbal mental age; ASC- autism spectrum conditions; BPVS- British 
Picture Vocabulary Scale; SAS-Social Aptitudes Scale; SCQ- Social Communication Questionnaire.  There was no 
difference in chronological age between the ASC and the CA-match participants (t(59)=1.39, p=0.17) and no 
difference in verbal mental age (assessed by the British Picture Vocabulary Scale- BPVS, [S3]) between the ASC 
and VMA-match participants (t(59)=0.15, p=0.88).   
 
Procedure 
Participants were introduced to the experimenter (E) and the demonstrator (D) in an empty 
classroom. Participants were told that they would watch D play with some toys and when she was 
finished, they would get a chance to play too. Throughout the experiment, E interacted with the 
participant and gave them instructions, while D showed the participant how to use the objects but 
did not interact with them in any other way. Participants were given two warm-up trials and five 
experimental trials. Warm-up trials contained a sequence of three actions but did not contain an 
unnecessary action. Experimental trials contained two necessary actions and one unnecessary action 
(see Table S2 for a description of the actions in each trial).  
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During each trial, E showed the participant a picture of D with the completed goal and said ‘Look at 
Lauren, she has a [toy elephant]. Lauren is going to show you how she [got the elephant out of the 
box]. Watch her carefully and then you will get a turn.  Words in [ ] were altered to be appropriate 
to each trial.  At this point, D entered the testing area and sat opposite the participant with the 
apparatus on the table in front of her. She demonstrated the sequence of necessary and 
unnecessary actions to complete the action goal (as described in Table S2). Once complete, D looked 
at the participant and smiled before putting up a screen and resetting the apparatus. Once reset, E 
gave the instructions Can you [get the elephant out]? Do it as quickly as you can. D then removed 
the screen and walked out of the testing area while the participant completed the task.  The 
instruction to complete the task ‘as quickly as you can’ differs from the ‘your turn’ instruction used 
in many previous overimitation tasks.  Our instructions emphasised speed and the goal of the action 
in order to maximise the goal-directed nature of the task.  Previous tests of different instructions 
[S4] suggest that typical children continue to overimitate when the task instructions are changed or 
when competition is emphasised. 
The current study also explored the role of ostensive signals in overimitation.  Previous studies have 
shown that ostensive cueing provides important information when children decide what to imitate 
[S5, S6]. We hypothesised that in the typically developing children, a clear ostensive signal such as 
eye contact, immediately prior to the performance of an unnecessary action might increase the 
propensity to imitate that action. Therefore, each trial included one eye contact event in which D 
paused during her demonstration and looked directly at the child for approximately one second 
before looking down and continuing with the demonstration.  The timing of eye contact was 
counterbalanced between the different action types, apparatus types and conditions.  Eye contact 
did not influence overimitation in either TD or ASC participants (CA-match: t(141)=1.24, p=0.22; 
VMA-match: t(137)=0.21, p=0.84; ASC: t(148)=0.76, p=0.45), so all other analyses  reported in this 
paper are collapsed across eye contact condition. 
 Following the five experimental trials, participants were then given a rationality discrimination task.  
The major motivation for including this task was to test for the possibility that children with autism 
have better causal reasoning than typical children, and to test if better casual reasoning might drive 
lower overimitation.  In this task, children were asked to rate one necessary and one unnecessary 
action from each sequence. They were first shown a scale with the numbers from one to five along 
the bottom with a picture of a man in a suit above the number one and a picture of a clown above 
the number five. The scale was explained to them as ranging from ‘very sensible’ (E points at the 
suited man) to ‘very silly’ (E points at the clown) or somewhere in between (E points at the numbers 
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two to four). D then came and demonstrated the actions one at a time and the participant was asked 
to rate it as sensible or silly by pointing at the scale.  E recorded the response and gave praise on 
every trial. 
In addition to the tests of overimitation and rationality discrimination, participants completed the 
British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS-II, [S3]) for VMA-matching. In order to explore the 
relationship between overimitation and theory of mind ability, ASC participants also completed a 
standard theory of mind battery, including six false belief questions and six trials of a penny hiding 
task as used in [S7]. 
Data Coding and Analysis 
The entire testing session was video recorded and coding was completed retrospectively.  All 
participants correctly completed the warm-up trials. Correct goal achievement was recorded if the 
participant was able to open the box or build the object. Performance was 100% for the TD children 
on all tasks.  One child with ASC failed to retrieve the duck or build the block tower due to increased 
sensory interest in the objects, and two children with ASC failed to make the fan, instead folding the 
paper in the wrong way.  For these participants, their imitation score was computed as a proportion 
of the number of trials that they did complete. Overall performance for the ASC group was 97%.  
Overimitation was scored from the videos.  On each trial, a participant was given a score of 1 if 
he/she completed the unnecessary action and a score of 0 if he/she did not.  Scores were summed 
to give a participant overimitation score range from 5 to 0. All coding was completed by two 
independent researchers and reliability between coding was good (Cohen’s kappa = 0.95).  
A rationality discrimination score was calculated for each trial by subtracting the participant’s rating 
of the necessary action in the sequence from his/her rating of the unnecessary action. This score 
therefore ranges from -4 to 4 and indicates the degree to which the participant is able to 
discriminate necessary and unnecessary actions, with higher scores indicating good discrimination 
and zero scores indicating chance performance.  Each participant’s mean rationality discrimination 
score was calculated for further analysis. 
Analysis of overimitation and rationality discrimination was conducted using separate univariate 
ANCOVAs for comparisons between the each of the TD groups and the ASC group. Group 
membership (TD or ASC) was entered as a between-subjects variable in each model. When 
comparing the VMA-matched group to the ASC group, raw BPVS score was added as a covariate and 
when comparing the CA-matched group to the ASC group, age was entered as a covariate. Main 
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effects of group are presented in the main text of this article. No effects of age, BPVS or interactions 
between these and group membership were found. 
Table S2: Description of rational (R) and irrational (IR) actions on each trial. 
Goal Action 1 Action 2 Action 3 
Warm-Up trials 
Make a pattern with beads 
on the rack 
Place bead 1 onto a 
peg  
Place bead 2 on top 
of bead 1 
Place bead 3 on top 
of bead 2 
Put doll into a container Remove lid from 
container 
Put doll into the 
container 
Put lid back on 
container 
Experimental trials 
Retrieve toy duck 
 
Unclip fastenings of 
box (R) 
Tap the top of the 
box twice with index 
finger (IR) 
Remove the lid of 
the box and retrieve 
duck (R) 
Retrieve toy elephant 
 
Remove elastic band 
(R) 
Slide box along the 
table and back again 
(IR) 
Remove the lid of 
the box and retrieve 
elephant (R) 
Retrieve toy lion 
 
Pull box towards you 
(R) 
Stroke the top of the 
box twice with index 
finger (IR) 
Remove the end of 
the box and retrieve 
lion (R) 
Build tower of blocks
 
Place block 1 in 
centre of table (R) 
Turn block 2 360 in 
your hands (IR) 
Place block 2 on top 
of block 1 and place 
block 3 on top of 
block 2 (R) 
Make a paper fan
 
Gather up concertina 
paper (R) 
Tap paper on the 
table twice (IR) 
Fold the paper in half 
to produce a fan (R) 
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Supplemental Results  
Overimitation 
As reported in the main text, children with ASC showed less overimitation than the CA-matched or 
VMA-matched typically developing children. To ensure that the four children without a confirmed 
diagnosis on the SCQ are not driving this difference, we performed the analyses again with these 
children excluded. The results remain unchanged (CA-match v. ASC subgroup: F(1,53)=12.9, p=0.004) 
and VMA-match v. ASC subgroup: (F(1,53)=6.2, p<0.01)). Furthermore, following the exclusion of 
these four participants the groups remain matched for chronological age (CA-match: t(55)=0.66, 
p=0.51) and verbal mental age  (VMA-match: t(55)=0.70, p=0.49). 
The number of children who failed to overimitate on any trial varied between groups. In the 
chronological age-matched group 7 children did not overimitate at all, this is compared to 12 
children in the VMA-matched group and 17 in the ASC group. 
Rationality Discrimination Score 
The rationality discrimination score was calculated by subtracting the ratings of the necessary 
actions from the ratings of the unnecessary actions. As reported in the main text, both CA-matched 
and VMA-matched typically developing groups were better at discriminating action rationality than 
the ASC group. These results remain unchanged when the four ASC children without SCQ diagnosis 
are excluded from the sample (CA-match v. ASC subgroup: F(1,53)=22.8, p<0.001) and VMA-match v. 
ASC subgroup: (F(1,53)=10.6, p=0.002). Despite the poorer performance of the ASC group, all three 
groups performed significantly above chance on the rationality discrimination score.  Histograms of 
the ratings given by each group are presented in Figure S1.  Both groups of TD children rated almost 
all the necessary actions as 1 and rated the unnecessary actions as 4 or 5.  Children with ASC are 
performing this task in a similar way, with the majority of responses falling at the extremes of the 
scale. However, they are also making more errors than the TD children, scoring more necessary 
actions as 5 and unnecessary actions as 1.   This can account for the reduced rationality 
discrimination scores found in the ASC group.  As children with ASC are performing significantly 
above chance on this measure, we conclude that they do understand the rating scale and are able to 
make judgements about the rationality of actions, yet they do not discriminate rational and 
irrational actions as clearly as TD children.  There is no evidence that reduced overimitation in 
autism is driven by better detection of action rationality or by better casual reasoning.   
In order to control for the effects of rationality discrimination ability on overimitation, all analyses 
were repeated with rationality discrimination score included as a covariate. The group difference 
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between the typically developing 
groups and the ASC group remains 
unchanged (CA-match: F(1,57)=6.19, 
p=0.02 ; VMA-match: F(1,57)=4.74, 
p=0.03). Furthermore, the effect of 
rationality discrimination score on 
overimitation was not significant (CA-
match: F(1,57)=1.42, p=0.24; VMA-
match: F(1,57)=0.46, p=0.50).  This 
suggests that overimitation is 
independent of a child’s ability to 
discriminate which actions are 
necessary or unnecessary in a 
sequence.  This finding is compatible 
with a social explanation of 
overimitation behaviour rather than an 
object learning or casual reasoning 
explanation. 
 
Figure S1, (related to Figure 1). 
Histograms of rationality ratings for 
necessary (panel A) and unnecessary 
(panel B) actions as given by CA-
matched TD participants (dark grey 
bars), VMA-matched participants (mid-
grey bars) and ASC participants (light 
grey bars).   
 
Predictors of imitation 
We also investigated what factors predict a child’s overimitation score.  Children with autism 
completed a battery of theory of mind tasks [S7] and their parents completed the lifetime version of 
the SCQ.  These measures were not available for the typically developing children due to time 
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constraints.   A composite theory of mind score was generated for each child, averaging 
performance on the false belief tasks and the penny hiding tasks.   We used linear regression to test 
if overimitation performance in children with autism was predicted by their age, BVPS score, ToM 
score, SAS score or SCQ score.  In total this model accounted for a significant proportion of the 
variance in overimitation scores (R
2
=0.44, p=0.02). However, no single variable was a significant 
predictor (age: t=0.41, p=0.68; bpvs: t=1.93, p=0.07; theory of mind: t=0.67, p=0.51; sas: t=0.02, 
p=0.99; SCQ: t=1.30, p=0.21). Note that our sample size of 31 is small for this type of analysis, and 
further study of the relationship between overimitation and other measures of social cognition 
would be valuable.  
Supplemental Discussion 
Overimitation is considered by some as a form of learning about objects that might have a role in 
cultural transmission of knowledge [S8] and in dealing with the problem of learning about causally 
opaque objects by means of pedagogy [S9].  However, these accounts are hard to apply to the 
simple, familiar, causally transparent objects used in our study.  More recently, there has been a 
focus on the social nature of overimitation [S10].  There is increasing evidence for parallels between 
childhood overimitation behaviour and adult mimicry behaviour [S11].  Mimicry in adults leads to 
increased liking [S12] and is commonly believed to be driven by a motivation to affiliate with others 
[S13].  There is less direct evidence that the same motivation to affiliate drives overimitation in 
children, but this is highly plausible [S10, S14].  An alternative social reason for overimitation could 
be the child’s desire to conform to the group norm [S15].   
Our overimitation task uses familiar, causally transparent objects and children were instructed to 
behave in a goal-directed fashion.  Ostensive and communicative cues were carefully controlled and 
all children understood that the unnecessary actions were ‘silly’.  This means that it is hard to explain 
the typically developing children’s overimitation in terms of object learning.  A social account is 
much more plausible.  However, the data in our task and many previous studies do not distinguish 
between a motivation to affiliate with others and a motivation to conform to a group norm.   
The results from the present study contrast with those recently reported in [S16] who show high 
rates of overimitation in children with ASC. This is despite both studies aiming to test the same 
hypothesis in children with autism with similar ability profiles. There are several possible reasons for 
this difference. First, the types of objects used in the two studies are very different. The present 
study used simple, familiar objects that were transparent in both their causal mechanism and their 
physical appearance. Furthermore, we directly test whether the children understood the causal 
nature of the actions demonstrated. In contrast, Nielsen et al. used objects that were causally 
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opaque in their mechanism and provide no check for participants’ understanding. It is possible 
therefore, that the overimitation reported by Nielsen et al. reflects object learning as well as social 
imitation and it is the object learning that drives imitation in ASC children.  A second difference 
between the studies is that the unnecessary actions in the present study were simple hand actions, 
whereas the unnecessary actions in the Nielsen et al. study involved the use of a tool. There is little 
previous research directly investigating the use of tools in overimitation compared to the use of 
unnecessary hand actions.  The simple hand actions used in our study remove the need for object 
learning and causal reasoning about actions, and provide a cleaner measure of social imitation. 
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